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Intra-industry trade with multinational firms
Abstract
Recent developments, including the analysis of firm-level adjustment to falling trade costs, have
contributed to a revival of interest in intra-industry trade (IIT). Most empirical work still relies on the
standard Grubel-Lloyd measure. This however refers only to international trade, disregarding income
flows stimulated by repatriated profits of multinational firms. Given the overwhelming importance of
the latter, this is a major shortcoming. This paper provides a guide to measurement and estimation of the
determinants of bilateral IIT shares from the perspective of new trade theory with multinational firms.
We develop an analytically solvable general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of investment
costs, multinational activities and income flows from repatriated profits. We also discuss and quantify
the bias of the Grubel-Lloyd index associated with repatriated profit flows of multinationals. Using
bias-corrected versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index as the dependent variable, we demonstrate that the
determinants motivated by our theoretical analysis offer important insights into variations in IIT shares.
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1 Introduction 
The publication of Grubel and Lloyd (1975) stimulated enormous interest in intra-industry 
trade (IIT), for two reasons. First, the empirical phenomenon of high levels of trade in 
products within industries between countries with similar factor endowments seemed at odds 
with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) workhorse model of international trade. 
Second, the observed increase in intra-industry trade coincided with what appeared to be 
relatively painless adjustment to economic integration in Western Europe. Dislocation 
anticipated as specialisation occurred did not materialise, giving rise to the so-called ‘smooth 
adjustment hypothesis’. 
 
In the decade that followed Grubel and Lloyd (1975) the literature exploded and proceeded in 
three directions: first, the measurement of IIT and its robustness to the use of more 
disaggregated data (Finger, 1975, Loertscher and Wolter, 1980, Greenaway and Milner, 1983, 
1984, 1986, studies in Tharakan, 1983, and Torstensson, 1996); second, its explanation from a 
theoretical point of view in models of monopolistic competition and international trade (most 
notably Lancaster 1980, Krugman, 1979, 1980 and 1981, and Helpman and Krugman, 1985) 
as well as strategic interaction (e.g., Brander, 1981, and Brander and Krugman, 1983); third, 
the empirical assessment of these models (Helpman, 1987, Bergstrand, 1990, and Hummels 
and Levinsohn, 1995).  
 
Recent years have seen a revival of interest in intra-industry trade, stimulated by frontier work 
on trade costs, economic geography and a range of aspects of firm level adjustment to 
globalization. Of particular interest, from both a theoretical and measurement point of view, is 
the relationship between intra-industry trade and multinational activity. We have known for a 
long time that both trade and multinational activity coexist, indeed are often coterminous, and 
that we need appropriate theoretical and empirical models for explaining this. 
 
An important development in understanding the relationship between IIT and intra-industry 
affiliate sales is Markusen and Maskus (2002). From a specification based on numerical 
simulations of a two-factor knowledge capital model (Carr, Maskus and Markusen, 2001 and 
Markusen, 2002), they find that intra-industry trade between the US and partner economies 
tends to decrease with greater similarity in size, which is consistent with the findings of 
Helpman (1987), Bergstrand (1990) or Hummels and Levinsohn (1995). They also find that 
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the intra-industry trade share decreases with the bilateral level of trade costs, but increases 
with the bilateral level of investment costs. Greenaway, Lloyd and Milner (2001) are also 
interested in the relationship between intra-industry trade and intra-industry affiliate 
production and develop an ‘extended intra-industry trade index’, which accounts for both 
traditional intra-industry trade and two-way exchange of international production. However, 
apart from these papers, the issue remains largely unexplored. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it demonstrates that the standard 
and still widely used Grubel-Lloyd index has to be adjusted to reflect the intra-industry trade 
share in a narrow sense. We show that with multinational firms, unbalanced profit repatriation 
distorts the index.1 In this respect, our study is complementary to Greenaway, Lloyd and 
Milner (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002), who discuss measures of intra-industry 
affiliate sales but do not deal with adjustments of the traditional Grubel-Lloyd index in the 
presence of multinational producers. We present a bias-corrected index that is robust to 
changes in foreign direct investment (FDI) and suitable for empirical work based on bilateral 
industry-level data.  
 
Second, we develop a three-factor general equilibrium model of trade and multinationals to 
provide a detailed analysis of the role of investment cost differences between countries as a 
determinant of intra-industry trade. By introducing three factors (physical capital, skilled 
labour, unskilled labour), we emphasise the distinction between two important characteristics 
of headquarters: their provision of physical capital to set up plants, and the human-capital 
intensive generation of firm-specific assets through brand proliferation. Besides this more 
complete description of headquarters services, there is an advantage of analytical tractability. 
In this setting, we are able to evaluate not only the role of investment cost levels and 
differences on intra-industry trade in general, but also their interaction with factor 
endowments. 
 
Finally, we implement and report on an empirical analysis, where uncorrected and bias-
corrected versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index are used as dependent variables. This yields 
several conclusions. We find that trade-imbalance bias not only influences the overall 
                                                 
1 The existence of multinational firms matters as well for other strands of the empirical trade literature. Ekholm 
(1998) remarks, for example, that the usual measures of revealed factor abundance may be substantially biased if 
trade in headquarters services of multinational firms is not correctly accounted for. In an empirical exercise, she 
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magnitude of the index but also systematically affects parameter estimates; cross-section 
estimates tend to be inconsistent if country-specific effects are excluded; the parameter signs 
are largely consistent with the theoretical hypotheses; determinants such as skilled labour 
endowments and investment costs suggested by our theoretical model account for a 
substantial part of the variation in intra-industry trade-share data. Only about half of their 
variation is explained by traditionally used variables as motivated by ‘new trade theory’ 
models. Given the crucial importance of accurately estimating intra- relative to inter-industry 
trade, this is very significant. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
background. It introduces a correction to the Grubel-Lloyd index and sets up an analytically 
solvable theoretical model of intra-industry trade with exporters and multinational firms. A 
numerical simulation analysis complements the analytical discussion. Section 3 presents our 
econometric analysis, reports our results and subjects them to a sensitivity analysis. Section 4 
concludes. 
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 The Grubel-Lloyd index 
The Grubel and Lloyd (1971) index has become the standard measure for the intensity of 
intra-industry trade. In the two-country case, it is defined as2 
 
( )2 min ,ik ik
k
ik ikk k
EX IM
GLI
EX IM
×= +∑ ∑ ∑ , (1) 
where ikEX  is the value of country i’s exports of good k. ikIM  represents expenditures for 
country i’s imports of good k. Although GLI has been the standard concept to assess the IIT 
share for over 30 years, it is less appropriate if there are multinational activities because GLI  
does not account for (unbalanced) repatriated profits of multinational firms and, therefore, 
underestimates the intra-industry trade share. For convenience, we use the term trade 
imbalance bias to refer to this measurement error.3 To see this, consider two economies with 
                                                                                                                                                        
shows that the usual measures underestimate the abundance of skilled labour and overestimate the abundance of 
physical capital in the US case. 
2 We do not distinguish between c.i.f. and f.o.b. data for the moment. For a discussion on different empirical 
specifications of the Grubel-Lloyd index see Subsection 3.1. 
3 Note that this has an entirely different motivation than the case made by Aquino (1978) for a correction of 
aggregate payments imbalance. As Greenaway and Milner (1981) showed, this is neither defensible on 
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one sector of production. From payments balance it follows that 
( )2 min ,i i i iEX IM EX IM× < + , if there are flows of repatriated profits due to multinational 
activities of country i firms in j. Thus, 1GLI < , according to (1). However, in a two-country 
one-sector model there is by definition only intra-industry trade in goods, so that the correct 
GLI must equal one. 
 
To obtain a better measure of the IIT share, we have to adjust the GLI for all income flows not 
due to goods trade, like repatriated profits. More precisely, we correct the denominator for all 
output flows that are balanced by income flows not directly related to exports and imports. 
This gives a hypothetical measure of balanced trade.4 The corrected Grubel-Lloyd index for 
the two-country, multi-sector case is then: 
 
( )2 min ,ik ik
k
ik ik ik ikk k k k
EX IM
CGLI
EX IM EX IM
×= + − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . (2) 
In our thought experiment with two one-sector economies and multinational activities of 
country i firms in country j, CGLI gives a correct measure of the intra-industry trade share, 
i.e., 1CGLI = .5 According to (1) and (2), we obtain 
 1 ik ikk k
ik ik ik ikk k k k
EX IMCGLI SHI
GLI EX IM EX IM
−= + ≡+ − −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , (3) 
with 1SHI ≥ , as a measure of the trade imbalance bias in relative terms. 
 
In what follows we are interested in the role of multinational activities and repatriated profits 
for income flows ik ikk kEX IM−∑ ∑ . In particular we investigate how changes in the fixed 
costs of multinational activities (see Amiti and Wakelin, 2003) affect the corrected Grubel-
Lloyd index given in (2) and the trade imbalance bias in (3). To identify the basic economic 
mechanisms, we introduce an analytically solvable general equilibrium model, which 
accounts for horizontal multinational activities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
theoretical grounds (in particular with respect to the assumption of equiproportional trade imbalancing effects) 
nor practicable. 
4 This adjustment method was in fact first suggested by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). However, they did not develop 
a clear theoretical motivation. Bergstrand (1983) correctly points out that there are other sources of trade 
imbalance (which are not related to multinational activity). The bias correction in (2) captures all sources of 
trade imbalance. However, as will become obvious in the econometric analysis below, there is a systematic 
relationship between bilateral intra-industry trade and the size of investment costs. This indicates that the simple 
two-country motivation for the bias correction is of empirical relevance. 
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2.2 An analytically solvable model of trade and horizontal FDI 
Consider two countries (i, j), which are endowed with three factors, unskilled labour L, skilled 
labour S and physical capital K. All three are inelastically supplied in competitive and 
internationally segmented factor markets. The countries may differ in their endowments of 
unskilled labour but are assumed to be symmetric with respect to their S- and K-supplies. 
There are two sectors of production. In the industrial X-sector differentiated goods are 
produced, while output in the agricultural Y-sector is homogeneous. Sector X is characterized 
by monopolistic competition and perfect competition prevails in sector Y. Throughout our 
analysis we focus on a parameter domain, which guarantees that both sectors are active in the 
two economies (diversification). Production technologies are given by x L=  and Y L= , 
respectively. To start up manufacture in the X-sector, firms have to invest capital and skilled 
labour as fixed non-production inputs. 
 
Two types of monopolistically competitive X-producers are distinguished: exporters and 
horizontal multinational enterprises (MNEs). An exporter serves consumers in both countries 
from a single production facility (at its headquarters location), while a horizontal 
multinational firm establishes a separate production plant in either economy and does not 
engage in final goods trade. Headquartering a firm (of either type) in a certain country induces 
investment of one unit of skilled labour and one unit of physical capital. Local production can 
start immediately. To set up a second facility abroad, the multinational has to invest a further 
amount of 1 0g − >  units of physical capital. Fixed non-production inputs come from the 
country of headquarters.6 In general, countries can differ in their investment cost parameters, 
i.e., , ,i jg g> = < . 
 
Exporting differentiated industrial output generates iceberg trade (i.e., transport) costs which 
are accounted for by parameter t>1 below. Trade in the homogeneous good does not induce 
any trade frictions. Hence, choosing the price of the agricultural good (of country i) as the 
numéraire, the wage rate of unskilled labour equals one in both economies (under 
diversification): 1Li Ljw w= = . 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 We can substitute ik jkEX IM=  in (2) if f.o.b. measures are used in the calculations of CGLI. This will be 
important in our analytical investigation below. 
6 This assumption is not crucial. In an extension, which is available from the authors upon request, we study a 
model variant, where multinational firms use physical capital from the foreign economy to set up an affiliate, 
there. It turns out that such a modification does not change our analytical results in qualitative terms. 
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In a next step, we describe profits of exporters (n) and horizontal multinational enterprises (h) 
in the X-sector. We denote local sales in country i (j) by iix  ( jjx ) and use variables ijx  ( jix ) 
to refer to exports from country i to country j (from j to i, respectively). Furthermore, iip  
( jjp ) and ijp  ( jip ) are the respective producer prices. Profits of an exporter with 
headquarters in country i are given by  
 ( ) ( )1 /ni ii ii ij ij Ki Sip x p t x t w wπ = − + − − −  (4) 
and profits of a horizontal multinational producer with headquarters in country i are 
represented by 
 ( ) ( )1 1hi ii ii jj jj i Ki Sip x p x g w wπ = − + − − − , (5) 
with Kiw , Siw  being factor prices of physical capital K and skilled labour S in country i. (The 
respective profits for producers with headquarters in j are analogous.) 
 
Three remarks are in order. First, 1Li Ljw w= =  has been used in (4) and (5). Second, all firms 
with headquarters in country i pay identical returns to skilled labour and physical capital if 
factor markets are perfectly competitive. Third, firm indices have been neglected as local 
output levels and exports turn out to be identical for all producers in equilibrium. 
 
Preferences of the representative consumer in either economy are Cobb-Douglas: 
 1U X Yα α−= ,  0 1α< <  (6) 
where 
/( 1)( 1) /
llX x
ε εε ε −−⎡ ⎤≡ ⎣ ⎦∑ , 1ε > , is a CES-index, that accounts for home-produced and 
imported varieties of the industrial good. Country indices are neglected for the moment. The 
budget constraint of the representative consumer implies l ll p x E≤∑ , with E  being the sum 
of total factor income and profits (in a particular economy) and lp  denoting the consumer 
price of variety l. Utility maximization leads to the following demand for variety l of the 
industrial good: 
 ll
Epx
P
εα −= , (7) 
where 1llP p
ε−≡ ∑  is a (country-specific) price index.  
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Goods market clearing conditions imply l iix x= , if variety l is produced and consumed in 
country i, and /l jix x t= , if variety l is produced in country j and exported to country i. 
(Analogously, l jjx x=  if variety l is produced and consumed in country j and /l ijx x t=  if 
variety l is produced in country i and exported to country j.) Since consumer and producer 
prices are identical, it follows from (4), (5) and (7) that profit maximization leads to a 
constant price-markup over variable production costs, i.e., ( )/ 1ii jjp p ε ε= = −  and 
( )/ 1ji ijp p tε ε= = − , respectively. Then, using 1 1t ετ −≡ < , ji iix x τ=  is implied by (7). 
 
Free entry of firms leads to zero profits in the X-sector. The zero-profit conditions determine 
equilibrium factor returns to skilled labour and physical capital as functions of output levels 
iix , jjx . Focussing on a parameter domain with positive factor returns, the following 
expressions are obtained: 
 1 1
1 1Ki jji
w x
g
τ
ε
−= − − ,       
11
1 1
i
Si ii jj
i
g
w x x
g
τ
ε
⎡ ⎤−= −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
, (8) 
 1 1
1 1Kj iij
w x
g
τ
ε
−= − − ,       
11
1 1
j
Sj jj ii
j
g
w x x
g
τ
ε
⎡ ⎤−= −⎢ ⎥− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (9) 
according to (4) and (5). In addition, the three factor market clearing conditions in country i 
are given by 
 ( )i i j i ii i jj iL h h n x n x Yτ= + + + + , (10) 
 i iS n h= + , (11) 
 i i iK n g h= + . (12) 
The respective factor market clearing conditions in country j lead to analogous expressions. 
By virtue of (11) and (12), the equilibrium numbers of horizontal multinational firms and 
exporters are given by 
 
1i i
K Sh
g
−= − ,       1
i
i
i
g S Kn
g
−= − , (13) 
 
1j j
K Sh
g
−= − ,       1
j
j
j
g S K
n
g
−= − . (14) 
Two properties of our framework should be noted. First, countries do not differ in the total 
number of local headquarters, if they do not differ in their skilled labour endowments, 
according to (11). However, it follows from (13) and (14) that countries differ in the 
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composition of firms if i jg g≠  (or i jK K≠ ). This implies countries may be asymmetric in 
terms of their local production facilities, even if they do not differ in their physical capital and 
skilled labour endowments. Second, the model is flexible enough to investigate the role of 
investment cost parameters ig , jg  for the composition of producers and the number of local 
production facilities in the two economies. However, any feedback effects on firm structure 
variables from output adjustments or income changes are ruled out by our assumption on 
factor use in production.7 
 
Finally, using i Ki Si iE w K w S L= + + , j Kj Sj jE w K w S L= + + , ( )1i ii i j i jP p h h n nε τ−= + + +  
and ( )1j jj i j j iP p h h n nε τ−= + + +  together with (7), we obtain8 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1 /
i i jj i
ii
j j j j
h n x L
x
n h h n
τ εα
ε α ε τ
+ + −= − + + + , (15) 
 
( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1 /
j j ii j
jj
i i i i
h n x L
x
n h h n
τ εα
ε α ε τ
+ + −= − + + + . (16) 
Equations (15) and (16) implicitly determine the equilibrium output levels iix  and jjx  as 
functions of country-specific factor endowments iL , jL  and investment cost parameters ig , 
jg . (Also S, K and trade costs t are determinants of output levels iix , jjx . But they are held 
constant throughout the analytical discussion.) 
 
Let us now turn to the intra-industry trade share. Under our specification, the uncorrected 
Grubel-Lloyd index is given by 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 min ,j ii i jj
j ii i jj i i jj j j ii
n x n x
GLI
n x n x n h x n h x
ετ
ετ ετ ετ= + + + − + , (1a) 
                                                 
7 In the numerical simulation exercises reported in Subsection 2.3, we relax the admittedly restrictive 
assumptions on factor use in X-sector production. 
8 Using iE , jE , iP  and jP  together with (7) gives 
Ki Si i
ii
ii i j i j
w K w S L
x
p h h n n
α
τ
+ += + + +  and 
Kj Sj j
jj
jj i j j i
w K w S L
x
p h h n n
α
τ
+ += + + + . Then, substituting for final goods prices iip , jjp  and factor returns Kiw , Siw , 
Kjw , Sjw , according to (8) and (9), and noting i i j jn h n h S+ = + = , straightforward calculations lead to (15) 
and (16). 
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according to (1). Note that ( ) ( )i i jj j j iin h x n h xετ ετ+ − +  is Y-trade according to the balance 
of payments condition.9  Furthermore, by virtue of (2), the corrected Grubel-Lloyd index is 
given by  
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 min ,j ii i jj
j ii i jj i i jj j j ii i jj j ii
n x n x
CGLI
n x n x n h x n h x h x h x
ετ
ετ ετ ετ= + + + − + − − , (2a) 
with i jj j iih x h x−  being the balance of repatriated profits for which the denominator of CGLI 
is adjusted. The ratio /CGLI GLI  of the corrected and uncorrected indexes can be written as 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1
i jj j ii
j ii i jj i i jj j j ii i jj j ii
h x h x
SHI
n x n x n h x n h x h x h xετ ετ ετ
−= + + + + − + − − . (3a) 
 
With equilibrium output levels and firm numbers at hand, we can investigate, how changes in 
the investment cost parameter affect the intra-industry trade share CGLI and the relative trade 
imbalance bias SHI . According to (2a) and (3a), a number of cases can be distinguished, as 
different combinations of , ,i jj j iin x n x> = <  and , ,i jj j iih x h x> = <  are possible. For expository 
reasons and to focus on the most important features of our model, we restrict the number of 
possible scenarios by assuming i jg g= . Taking this as a starting point, we can determine the 
impact of a marginal ig -increase (over jg ). 
 
To proceed with the formal analysis, it is useful to introduce a new variable: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )
/ / 1 / / 1 /
, , , ,
/ / 1 / / 1 /
j j i j j j j j
i j i j
i i j i i i i i
h n L h n h n L
g g L L
h n L h n h n L
α ε τ α ε τξ α ε τ α ε τ
⎡ ⎤+ + − + + +⎣ ⎦≡ ⎡ ⎤+ + − + + +⎣ ⎦
 (17) 
which gives the firm number-weighted output ratio /i jj j iin x n x  in a diversification 
equilibrium, according to (15) and (16).10 Two comparative-static results are notable. First, 
there is a market size effect. A higher /j iL L  raises the volume (and value) of differentiated 
goods exports from country i to country j as compared to the volume (and value) of 
                                                 
9 By assumption, consumers prefer the home-supplied homogeneous good in the case of identical prices. This 
implies a unique value of Y-trade in the absence of any trade friction for homogeneous goods. Moreover, note 
that we consider f.o.b. trade flows (net of any iceberg trade costs) in eqs. (1a)-(3a) and throughout the rest of the 
theoretical analysis. This implies that ik jkEX IM=  (see Footnote 5). For a rigorous discussion on different 
concepts of the Grubel-Lloyd index, see Subsection 3.1. 
10 One can solve system (15), (16) explicitly for iix  and jjx . Then, multiplying the ratio /jj iix x  with /i jn n  
gives (17). 
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differentiated goods exports from country j to country i. According to (17), this leads to an 
increase in ( )ξ ⋅ . Second, there is an investment cost effect. The higher ig  the lower is the 
ratio between the number of multinational firms and the number of exporters in country i 
( /i ih n ), according to (13). A lower /i ih n , however, leads to an increase in the volume (and 
value) of differentiated goods exports from country i to country j relative to the volume (and 
value) of affiliate sales of country i multinationals in j. Thus, ( )ξ ⋅  increases in ig , according 
to (17) (see Appendix for further details). 
 
Substituting (17) into (2a) and noting that ( ), , , 1i jg g L Lξ >  if j iL L>  and ( ), , , 1i jg g L Lξ <  
if j iL L< , one can show that11 
 
( )
( )1/i j
j i
g g
j i
if L L
CGLI
if L L
ξ
ξ=
⋅ <⎧⎪= ⎨ ⋅ >⎪⎩
 (18) 
 
By virtue of (3a), we can also conclude that 
 
( )
( )
/ /
1 1
2 /
/ / 11
2 /
i j
j j i i
j i
j j
g g
j j i i
j i
j j
h n h n
if L L
h n
SHI
h n h n
if L L
h n
ξετ
ετ ξ
=
⎧ ⎛ ⎞+ − ⋅ <⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪⎪ ⎝ ⎠= ⎨ ⎛ ⎞⎪ + − >⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟⋅⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
 (19) 
 
Then, using (18) and (19), we can formulate two propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider j iL L<  and i jg g= . Then, a marginal increase of ig  (over jg ) 
raises both the intra-industry trade share (CGLI) and the trade imbalance bias in relative 
terms (SHI). 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
If j iL L<  and i jg g= , there is a market size advantage of country i and ( ) 1ξ ⋅ < . If ig  is 
(marginally) increased over jg  the associated investment cost effect counteracts the market 
                                                 
11 Recall our assumption that both sectors are active in the two countries. This requires that iL  and jL  are not 
too different. 
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size advantage of country i and ( )ξ ⋅  increases (see our discussion below equ. (17)). By virtue 
of equ. (18) this leads to a higher CGLI . Loosely speaking, the increase in ig  makes the two 
countries ‘more similar’ in terms of their economic capacity, so that the CGLI  result in 
Proposition 1 is in line with a key insight from the literature on intra-industry trade, namely 
that the IIT share increases in the similarity of countries (see Helpman, 1987, Bergstrand, 
1990, Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995). The fact that countries become more similar tends to 
reduce SHI ceteris paribus, according to (19). However, since an increase in ig  reduces 
/i ih n , according to (13), there is a counteracting effect. It turns out that the firm structure 
effect dominates, explaining a negative impact of ig  on SHI. Summing up, if j iL L<  and 
i jg g= , an increase of ig  (over jg ), makes countries more similar in terms of their goods 
trade and raises CGLI. At the same time, the difference in repatriated profits increases relative 
to the sum of ‘trade-imbalance corrected’ trade flows and SHI goes up. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider j iL L>  and i jg g= . Then, a marginal increase of ig  (over jg ) 
lowers both the intra-industry trade share (CGLI) and the trade imbalance bias in relative 
terms (SHI). 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
If j iL L> , an increase in ig  reinforces j’s market size advantage due to its better endowment 
of L. This leads to an increase in ( )ξ ⋅  and, by virtue of (18), to a decline in CGLI. The 
increase in ( )ξ ⋅  stimulates SHI, according to (19). However, the induced decline in /i ih n  
counteracts and dominates this effect, so that SHI goes down. 
2.3 Numerical simulation analysis  
The theoretical framework in Subsection 2.2 has built upon two critical simplifications that 
have been imposed for analytical tractability. First, our assumptions concerning factor use in 
production of X- and Y-goods ruled out any feedback effects on firm structure variables h and 
n. Second, by focussing on horizontal multinational enterprises we did not account for vertical 
motives of foreign direct investment, which may be prevalent if countries differ sufficiently in 
their factor endowments or production technologies. 
 
 13
To relax these two restrictive assumptions, we use numerical simulation techniques and 
investigate the impact of investment costs and other determinants of intra-industry trade in an 
extended theoretical framework, in which all three factors are used by X-producers as variable 
production inputs in a CES-technology. In addition, we allow for existence of exporters and 
horizontal as well as vertical multinational enterprises (but keep the assumptions of 
Subsection 2.2 in all other respects). This gives us a variant of the so-called knowledge-
capital (KK) model.12 For expositional reasons, we relegated a summary of the details on the 
set-up and the numerical simulation of the model to Appendix B. 
 
In the extended model variant, we can analyse the role of bilateral country size, relative 
capital-to-unskilled labour endowment ratios, relative skilled-to-unskilled labour endowment 
ratios, trade costs, and investment costs for the corrected Grubel-Lloyd index (CGLI).13 
Thereby, we choose a parameterisation that leads to both two-way trade and two-way 
horizontal multinational activity in the benchmark scenario of two fully symmetric countries 
(see Appendix B for details on the underlying parameter values). As we would expect, there is 
no reason for vertical MNE activity or homogeneous goods trade, and both (differentiated) 
goods trade flows as well as flows of repatriated profits are balanced in this case. 
 
Taking a scenario with full symmetry as a starting point, we first consider the impact of 
country size differences on CGLI (assuming that relative factor endowments, trade costs, and 
investment costs remain identical in the two economies). To illustrate this impact in Figure 1, 
we vary a country’s endowments with all factors of production (as a measure of its GDP) 
between 40 percent and 60 percent of the overall world endowments. From this exercise, we 
can conclude that the CGLI increases in country size (i.e., GDP) similarity.14 
 
> Figure 1 < 
 
                                                 
12 Note that both the model of vertical MNEs (Helpman, 1984, Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and that of 
horizontal MNEs (Markusen, 1984, Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000) can be seen as restricted variants of 
the KK model, in which both types of firms may endogenously arise (Carr, Maskus and Markusen, 2001, 
Markusen, 2002). 
13 Due to space limitations, we do not provide a detailed discussion of the determinants of the trade imbalance 
bias (SHI), here. Rather, it is the aim of this subsection to derive empirically testable hypothesis for the main 
determinants of the bias-corrected IIT share. 
14 Bergstrand (1990) derives a similar result for the relationship between country size symmetry and the intra-
industry trade share in a setting without multinational activity. 
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Besides the relationship between country size and CGLI, we are also interested in the impact 
of relative factor endowments, trade costs, and investment costs. To avoid clutter, we 
investigate the role of these variables separately and assume countries to be symmetric in all 
other respects. Similar to the analysis of country size effects and CGLI, we design the 
simulation set-ups such that countries are identical in the centre of each of the figures 
associated with the different experiments. Our findings are summarized in Figures 2a-2d (in 
Figures 2c and 2d countries are identical at all configurations along the main diagonal). 
 
> Figures 2a-2d < 
 
Figure 2a displays the numerical surface of CGLI for different capital-to-unskilled labour 
endowment ratios. In the figure, ik  and il  refer to country i’s shares of i jK K+  and i jL L+ , 
respectively. Each country’s skilled labour endowment amounts to 50 percent of the world 
endowment. Figure 2b illustrates the corresponding relationship between skilled-to-unskilled 
labour endowment ratios and CGLI at identical endowments with physical capital. In that 
figure, is  refers to country i’s shares of i jS S+  and il  has the same interpretation as in Figure 
2a. In Figures 2c and 2d, we display the impact of trade costs for exports from country i to j 
( ijt ) and vice versa ( jit ) and fixed factor requirements for foreign subsidiary set-up in the two 
markets ( ig  and jg ), given symmetry in the remaining parameters.
 15 A general insight from 
these figures is that CGLI tends to increase with greater symmetry in relative factor 
endowments (Figures 2a and 2b), trade costs (Figure 2c) and investment costs (Figure 2d).16 
 
One further remark is in order here. In our simulation experiments, we do not consider a 
change in the overall market size or the magnitude of world-wide factor endowments. In the 
empirical model, however, we have to account for overall size effects and therefore control 
for the maximum and the minimum value of a bilateral variable separately (see Hummels and 
Levinsohn, 1995, for a specification including maximum and minimum values of bilateral 
                                                 
15 In terms of our analytical model, ijt  gives the volume of production in country i that is necessary if one unit of 
the differentiated good is consumed in country j i≠ . Recall that ij jit t=  has been assumed in Subsection 2.2. 
16 In Figures 2a and 2b we see that the impact of symmetry in relative factor endowments becomes less clear if 
we allow for pronounced differences in relative factor endowments. These are the relative factor endowment 
regions, associated with vertical multinational activity. Hence, our numerical exercises indicate that the impact 
of relative factor endowments on CGLI depends on the mode of multinational activity. 
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determinants of intra-industry trade). To obtain a proper empirical specification, we define 
ijLCGLI  as the logistically transformed, corrected Grubel-Lloyd index
17 and write: 
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where ζij is an error term. If overall size effects do not matter, we expect from the simulation 
exercises that a higher maximum of bilateral GDP, relative factor endowments, trade or 
investment costs exhibit a negative impact on CGLI, while a higher bilateral minimum of 
these variables should have a positive effect. However, if absolute size effects are of 
relevance, at least the difference in the coefficients between the minimum and maximum 
variables should be positive, as CGLI tends to increase in the similarity of countries, 
according to Figures 1 and 2a-2d (at least, if horizontal multinational firms are prevalent). 
3 Empirical analysis 
3.1 The Grubel-Lloyd index, an empirical approach 
Grubel and Lloyd (1971) had in mind a model without multinational firms. However, MNE 
activities are now understood as an essential channel of international exchange. With 
multinational firms, trade is unlikely balanced (even in a two-country setting). This makes a 
correction of the GLI necessary. Since it is difficult to find reliable data on flows of 
repatriated profits for a large country sample, we apply the adjustment method formulated by 
equ. (2) in the empirical analysis. Using data at the bilateral level, this means that we correct 
the denominator of the Grubel-Lloyd index for bilateral trade imbalance.18 To provide 
insights into the role of multinational activity for the intra-industry trade share and the trade 
                                                 
17 Formally, we have ( )ln /(1 )ij ij ijLCGLI CGLI CGLI≡ − . 
18 Using data on bilateral OECD trade between 1990 and 2000, we can show that the downward bias of the 
uncorrected index due to trade imbalance is about 14 percentage points on average, which is more than 50% of 
the mean. For an extensive discussion on different biases that affect the Grubel-Lloyd index in empirical data 
and a quantification of these biases, we refer the interested reader to the working paper version of this paper (see 
the References for the URL). 
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imbalance bias, we use investment costs as an explanatory variable. Theoretical hypotheses 
for the impact of these costs have been derived in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
A further issue that arises in an empirical analysis of intra-industry trade is the role of trade 
costs. First, trade costs themselves may be a key determinant of the intra-industry trade share 
and the volume of multinational activity. Hence, they should be used as an explanatory 
variable in the empirical analysis (see our theoretical results in Subsection 2.3). To the best of 
our knowledge, however, the role of trade costs has not been rigorously accounted for in 
previous work on the Grubel-Lloyd index. Second, it makes a difference, whether c.i.f. or 
f.o.b. data are used for constructing the (corrected or uncorrected) GLI variable. To account 
for this fact, we introduce two alternative versions of the corrected index. The following table 
summarises different definitions.19 
 
Lable Definition Interpretation 
ijGLI  
 
( )2 min( , )ijk ijk ij ij
k
EX IM EX IM⋅ +∑  
Where ij k ijkEX EX= ∑  are aggregate f.o.b. exports 
of and ij ijkkIM IM= ∑  are the corresponding c.i.f. 
imports of country i. Missing values at the 
disaggregated level are treated as 0. 
a
ijCGLI  
 
min( , ) min( , )ijk ijk ij ij
k
EX IM EX IM∑  As ijGLI , but corrected for bilateral trade 
imbalances. 
b
ijCGLI  
 
min( , ) min( , )ijk jik ij ji
k
EX EX EX EX∑  As aijCGLI , but based on trade flows at f.o.b. 
 
In the case of a two-country, new trade theory model with zero trade costs and no MNE 
activity, a bGLI CGLI CGLI≡ ≡ .20 However, trade imbalance (e.g. due to multinational 
activity), leads to a downward bias of the uncorrected index. The two candidates of the bias-
corrected index, aCGLI  and bCGLI , differ if trade costs are positive. If we use export data at 
f.o.b., the corrected GLI has the same value for either member of a country pair. Then, one 
should only rely on a single observation for each country-pair to avoid an upward bias in 
significance levels in empirical applications. While this leads to a reduced number of 
                                                 
19 The Grubel-Lloyd indices measure bilateral intra-industry trade in a multi-country world. Hence, ijEX  are 
country i’s exports to and ijIM  are country i’s imports from country j. Index k indicates different industries. 
20 To improve readability, we suppress country indices from now on. 
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observations (see below), such an approach is more closely related to our theoretical analysis. 
For the latter reason, bCGLI  serves as our preferred measure of the intra-industry trade share. 
However, we also report regression results for aCGLI  and compare the estimated coefficients 
for the two variants of bias-corrected indices with the respective coefficients for the 
uncorrected index. 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
We estimate model (20) for the three concepts of the Grubel-Lloyd index ( LGLI , aLCGLI  
and bLCGLI – with ‘L’ referring to a logistically transformed variable). Our data base 
comprises 422 observations of 1990-2000 bilateral average IIT share data of OECD countries 
for bLCGLI  after excluding missing values, while there are about twice as many observations 
for LGLI  and aLCGLI . (A detailed data description is provided in Appendix C.) Table 1 
summarizes our findings. 
 
> Table 1 < 
 
Those variables not usually considered in empirical work but motivated by our theoretical 
analysis (with the parameters 5δ ,…, 10δ ) account for 41%-49% of the regression models’ 
explanatory power. This emphasises the relevance of the MNE-related new trade theory 
literature for core empirical issues of international trade. Note further that the reported F-tests 
on the parameters indicate that using a simple measure of similarity or also the average of 
bilateral size, factor endowments, and trade and investment impediments is inferior to the 
chosen strategy of including each variable’s bilateral maximum and minimum value 
separately. The R2 is higher for the uncorrected GLI-based model in Table 1 than for the two 
CGLI-based ones. However, the R2s are not directly comparable for two reasons. First, we use 
logistically transformed values of the dependent variable and, in our application, the 
transformation leads to a bigger variance of the corrected Grubel-Lloyd indices as compared 
to their uncorrected counterpart. Second, the model for bLCGLI  relies on a much smaller 
sample than the other two models.21 
                                                 
21 In addition, there might be other variables facilitating trade imbalances that do not enter our empirical model. 
For instance, cross-national transfers (e.g. in the form of foreign aid payments or remittances of migrants) could 
lead to both moderate explanatory power and biased parameter estimates. In a cross-sectional framework with 
country-pair data, these variables can be captured by fixed country effects (see the sensitivity analysis in the next 
subsection). 
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The results – especially those for the preferred bLCGLI  measure – are well in line with the 
three-factor KK-model of multinational activity in Subsection 2.3. In particular, the evidence 
in Table 1 supports our theoretical finding that similarity as such tends to raise the share of 
intra-industry trade in total trade. As expected from the surfaces of the numerically solved 
model, the difference between the coefficients of the minimum and maximum values of 
determinants at the bilateral level is almost always positive: 0,...,0 91012 >−>− δδδδ . The 
only exception from this is the finding for the impact of minimum and maximum capital-to-
unskilled labour ratios in specification bLCGLI . Our numerical simulation results in Figures 
2a and 2b indicate that the existence of vertical multinational enterprises may be responsible 
for that outcome (see Footnote 16).22 
 
It turns out that measurement biases in IIT share indices do not only affect the mean (as 
picked up by the constant), but there is some systematic bias, which is correlated with 
important explanatory variables. This becomes obvious, in particular, if we compare the 
coefficients of the LGLI  model with their counterparts in the preferred bLCGLI  model. In 
line with the simulation results in Subsection 2.3, a higher maximum GDP exhibits a 
significantly negative impact on intra-industry trade in the bLCGLI  regression, while the 
respective impact is positive and insignificant if the LGLI  concept is used. In addition, the 
negative effect of an increase in the maximum skilled-to-unskilled labour ratio is almost four 
times higher if bLCGLI  is used instead of LGLI . 
3.3 Sensitivity analysis 
We check the sensitivity of our results with respect to the exclusion of extreme outliers and 
the inclusion of exporter and importer fixed effects. Thereby, we concentrate on the two bias-
corrected concepts of the GLI. With respect to outliers, we follow Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 
(1980) and exclude all observations with absolute residuals exceeding two standard errors of 
the regression. Only 2% (1%) of observations have to be eliminated in the bLCGLI  
( aLCGLI ) model. Fixed country-specific effects are able to control for all country-specific 
unobserved variables – such as cross-national transfers or third-country influences on one of 
                                                 
22 It should be noted that the positive impact of both the minimum and the maximum capital-to-unskilled labour 
ratios for all three concepts of intra-industry does not support previous empirical findings by Bergstrand (1990), 
who reports a negative impact of the average capital-labour endowment ratio and an insignificant impact of a 
country pair’s inequality of the capital-labour endowment ratio. 
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the two trading partners in a multi-country setting – which may otherwise be picked up by the 
parameters of interest (see Baltagi, 2001). The parameters of the included variables can still 
be estimated, since there is enough variation in maximum and minimum values of the 
explanatory variables. 
 
> Table 2 < 
 
Excluding extreme outliers substantially increases the explanatory power of our empirical 
model (see the R2 values in Table 1 and in the first two columns of Table 2). Inclusion of 
fixed exporter and importer effects leads to a further increase of the R2s and a convergence of 
the respective values for the aLCGLI  and the bLCGLI  model.23 The share of R2s accounted 
for by variables 5-10 (which are usually not controlled for in the empirical literature on intra-
industry trade) increases if we exclude outliers and include exporter and importer fixed 
effects. 
 
Accounting for country-specific effects to guard against an omitted variable bias has also 
consequences for the qualitative results of the empirical analysis. In particular, the minimum 
GDP coefficients as well as the maximum GDP coefficient in the aLCGLI  model become 
negative if fixed country effects are accounted for. Furthermore, the negative impact of the 
maximum skilled-to-unskilled labour ratio becomes insignificant in both models of corrected 
indices and the positive impact of the minimum skilled-to-unskilled labour ratio becomes 
significant in the bLCGLI  model. Finally, the minimum trade cost variable turns out to be 
insignificant in the aLCGLI  as well as the bLCGLI  fixed effects model. Again, the majority 
of the estimated coefficients points to a positive impact of country similarity on bilateral IIT 
shares. However, the negative impact of GDP similarity in the fixed effects model for 
bLCGLI  is not in line with our theoretical hypotheses based on Figure 1. 
3.4 Extensions 
In this subsection, we address two further issues that appeared in the theoretical analysis in 
Subsection 2.2. First, we study the impact of unskilled labour endowments on the bias-
                                                 
23 If we exclude outliers and include fixed effects, the R2 for the uncorrected GLI model (not reported in Table 2) 
is, with a value of 0.87 , slightly lower than the respective R2s in the last two columns of Table 2. See our 
discussion on that issue in the last subsection. 
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corrected IIT share and, second, we investigate the role of unskilled labour endowments and 
investment costs for the trade-imbalance bias in relative terms, SHI. 
 
> Table 3 < 
 
Our analytical results in Subsection 2.2 suggest that the impact of an increase in investment 
costs on the corrected GLI is the more likely positive, the larger is iL  compared to jL . To 
assess this hypothesis empirically, we construct an interaction term between the difference of 
maximum and minimum log investment costs and the unskilled labour endowment variable 
(see Table 3). According to the theoretical insights presented in Subsections 2.2 and 2.3, we 
expect a negative (positive) sign of the maximum (minimum) investment cost effect (δ7<0, 
δ8>0) and a positive one for the interaction term (δ11>0). As the point estimates in Table 3 
indicate, the empirical findings support our theoretical hypotheses, irrespective of which 
CGLI concept is used. 
 
> Table 4 < 
 
With respect to the trade-imbalance bias in relative terms, we would expect that SHI falls with 
the difference between maximum and minimum investment costs, in particular, if the country 
with the maximum investment costs is less well endowed with unskilled labour.24 Table 4 
provides insights in the empirical relevance of this hypothesis. There, we distinguish between 
the two variants of bias-correction when constructing the SHI variable. To ensure that the 
calculated coefficients do not capture an impact that is due to the different treatment of trade 
costs in the bias-corrected and the uncorrected GLI, we distinguish two variants of the 
uncorrected GLI, namely aGLI  (where exports are used at a f.o.b. basis and imports are used 
at a c.i.f. basis) and bGLI  (where all trade flows are at a f.o.b. basis). The two variants of the 
trade-imbalance bias measure are given by /a a aSHI CGLI GLI=  and /b b bSHI CGLI GLI= , 
respectively. 
 
Three results in Table 4 are particularly notable. First, the point estimates of the interaction 
term between investment costs and unskilled labour endowments have the signs expected 
from our theoretical analysis. Second, country-specific effects are important, indicating that 
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bilateral trade-imbalances have a country-specific component and are not the same for all 
country pairs. Third, we have to concede that investment costs explain a relatively small 
though significant share of the deviation between the two indices as indicated by the R2 
figures. The other explanatory variables in previous tables only contribute insignificantly. 
Hence, other macro-economic variables, not accounted for in the theoretical model and 
empirical specifications are probably relevant, too. However, to study their impact is beyond 
the scope of this analysis. 
4 Conclusions 
In a review of the empirical analysis of international trade flows spanning the last 50 years, 
Leamer (1994, p. 68) identifies “the extensive amount of intra-industry trade catalogued by 
Grubel and Lloyd (1975)…..” as “….. one of the only two major empirical findings (which) 
seem to have had a major impact on the way (trade) economists think”. That conclusion 
articulates a widely accepted view that the apparent pervasiveness of intra-industry trade 
stimulated a revolution in the theoretical and empirical modelling of international trade. 
 
From the standpoint of empirical investigation, it is obviously vital that the intra-industry 
trade share is measured as accurately as possible. Thirty years after the publication of Grubel 
and Lloyd (1975), their famous index remains the measure of choice for most investigators. 
Yet we know it is grounded in the assumption of arms-length trade. However, multinational 
activity is a feature of the landscape which should not be ignored. In this paper we have 
brought their presence to centre-stage. We have constructed a three factor general equilibrium 
model of trade with multinationals, to identify precisely the impact of investment costs and 
multinational activity on intra-industry trade. The model and measures of intra-industry trade 
derived from it have been subjected to extensive simulation analysis and rigorous econometric 
assessment (for trade flows of 31 OECD countries). 
 
Our analysis demonstrates clearly the role of investment costs and biases inherent in the 
Grubel-Lloyd index when we fail to account for the presence of multinationals. It also shows 
that it is important to consider various new determinants of IIT alongside more traditional 
explanatory variables. We hope that the theoretical underpinning provided for our new 
measures and their robust empirical performance will commend their wider use. 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 Proposition 2 shows that the SHI-effect of a ig  increase is negative if j iL L> . 
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 A1
Appendix 
A. Analytical appendix 
Recall that we focus on a parameter domain, which gives rise to diversification in the 
production structure. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Substituting ( ) ( )/ /i i ih n K S g S K= − − , according to (13), into (17), it is straightforward to 
derive ( ), , , / 0i j i j ig g L L gξ∂ ∂ > . Noting further that ( )CGLI ξ= ⋅  if j iL L<  and i jg g= , 
the CGLI-effect in Proposition 1 follows immediately. In addition, (19) implies that  
 ( )/ /1 1
2 /
j j i i
j j
h n h n
SHI
h n
ξετ
⎛ ⎞= + − ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, (A1) 
if j iL L<  and i jg g= . Substituting 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
/ 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 //
/ / 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 /
j j i j j j j ji i
j j i i j i i i i i
n h L n h n h Lh n
h n n h L n h n h L
α ε τ α ε τξ α ε τ α ε τ
⎡ ⎤+ + − + + +⎣ ⎦⋅ = ⎡ ⎤+ + − + + +⎣ ⎦
 (A2) 
into (A1) and differentiating the respective expression with respect to ig , it follows from (13) 
and (14) that / 0iSHI g∂ ∂ >  if evaluated at i jg g=  and j iL L< . This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1. QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Using ( ), , , / 0i j i j ig g L L gξ∂ ∂ >  and noting that ( )1/CGLI ξ= ⋅  if j iL L>  and i jg g= , the 
CGLI-effect in Proposition 2 follows immediately. Furthermore, (19) implies 
 ( )
/ / 11
2 /
j j i i
j j
h n h n
SHI
h nετ ξ
⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅⎝ ⎠
 (A3) 
if j iL L>  and i jg g= . 
 
Let us define ( ) ( )
/ 1, , ,
/ , , ,
i i
i j i j
j j i j i j
h n
g g L L
h n g g L LξΩ ≡ − . Then, substituting (13), (14) and 
(17) into ( )Ω ⋅  and differentiating the resulting expression with respect to ig  , we obtain 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
/ / 2 / /
1
/ / 1 / / 1 /
/ /
/
j j j j j i
i j j i j j j j j
i i i
j j
h n L h n L
g h n L h n h n L
h n g
h n
α ε α ε
α ε τ α ε τ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ −∂Ω ⋅ ⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟∂ ⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟+ + − + + +⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
∂ ∂×
 (A4) 
with ( )/ / 0i i ih n g∂ ∂ < . Hence, we can conclude from (A4) that ( ) / , , 0ig∂Ω ⋅ ∂ > = <  if 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 / / / , , 1 / 2 / 1j j i j j jh n L h n Lα ε α ε τ α ε τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− − > = < − + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . (A5) 
Thus, j iL L≥  is sufficient for ( ) / 0ig∂Ω ⋅ ∂ < . And, as a consequence, / 0iSHI g∂ ∂ <  if 
evaluated at i jg g=  and j iL L> . This completes the proof of Proposition 2. QED. 
 
B. Simulation appendix 
We set up a numerically solvable model, where horizontal and vertical MNEs may 
endogenously arise. We use a CES production technology in the X-sector. The corresponding 
input coefficients are denoted by LXia , HXia , and KXia  (and derived as a function of factor 
prices below). The encompassing framework consists of the following set of equations (only 
outlined for country i): 
 
Pricing conditions 
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( ) ( )
1 1/
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0
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where YjP  denotes the price of good Y in country j and ⊥  indicates that one of the adjacent 
conditions holds with equality (see Markusen, 2002, for an excellent discussion of 
complementary slackness in general equilibrium models with MNEs). 
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Goods market clearing conditions 
Let us first define the modified price aggregator as ( ) ( )1 1i ii i j i j j i jiP p h h n v n v pε ε− −= + + + + + . 
Then, the goods market clearing conditions in the X-sector imply 
1
1
0
/
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ii ii i i
ii
ij ij ij j j
ij
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α
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− −
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⊥ ≥
 
Note that the goods market clearing condition for local homogeneous goods demand in 
country i (Yii) is redundant due to the choice of numéraire. However, that one of country j 
implies25 
( ) ( )1Yj jj ij jP Y Y Eα+ ≥ −  
0YjP⊥ ≥  
 
Factor market clearing conditions26 
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( ) ( )
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Conditions on firm entry (i.e., non-negative profit conditions) 
( )
( )
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0
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25 Being interested in intra-industry trade, we consider a parameter domain, which guarantees diversification in 
the production pattern of both economies. Hence, 1YjP =  holds in equilibrium. 
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Numerical simulation of the model 
We assume the following values for world factor endowments: 300i jK K+ = ; 
200i jS S+ = ; 100i jL L+ = . For the demand parameters, we assume: 6ε =  and 0.8α = . 
The choice of the elasticity of substitution parameter between varieties is well in line with the 
findings in Feenstra (1994). 
 
Regarding production, we assume a constant elasticity of scale technology, with the following 
(cost-minimizing) input coefficients: 
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 11 1 1
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SXi Ki LiSi Si
KXi Ki Ki Li
a w b a w b w a b w
a w a b a w b w a b w
a w a a w b w
ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ
− − − −− − − −
− − − −− − − −
− − −− − −
−− − − −
−− − − −
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⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − − + + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= + +
1
1
11(1 ) Sia b w
ρ ρρρ −−
−−⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The technology parameters take the following values: 10ρ = − ; 0.3a = ; 0.5b = . Our choice 
of the parameter related to the technical rate of substitution points to a complementary 
relationship between factors of production, which is in line with recent evidence (see Sharma, 
2002). Furthermore, in the baseline scenario we assume that 1.2i jg g= =  and that 
1.15ij jit t= = . The assumption that iceberg trade costs vary around 15% is well in line with 
the stylized facts (see Baier and Bergstrand, 2001). 
 
C. Data appendix 
Data sources and definition 
We use bilateral export and import flow data at the Standard International Trade 
Classification 5-digit level as published by the OECD (International Trade by Commodity 
Statistics, 1990-2000). Bilateral trade costs are based on trade-weighted averages of 
c.i.f./f.o.b. figures from this source. Table A.1 provides summary statistics for the dependent 
variable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 Note that a vertical multinational firm operates a single production plant abroad and, therefore, has to invest 
the amount of 1ig −  units of physical capital before it can start to produce. 
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> Table A.1 < 
 
Real GDP figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and measured in 
constant US dollars of 1995. Capital stock data had to be computed by the perpetual inventory 
method as discussed in Leamer (1984, pp.232-234). Since no data on depreciation rates are 
available for our countries, the same value as in Leamer (i.e., 13.3%) is assumed. Capital 
stock computations are based on gross fixed capital formation data and the corresponding 
investment cost deflators published in the World Development Indicators. Data on human 
capital measure the average years of schooling of participants in the active labour force (see 
Baier, Dwyer and Tamura, 2002, for more details). Data on both physical capital and skilled 
labour endowments were kindly provided by Scott Baier. Investment cost data are based on 
score variables published in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. 
Amiti and Wakelin (2003) provide a detailed description. The data were kindly provided by 
Keith Maskus. Table A.2 provides the correlation matrix and summary statistics for the 
explanatory variables. 
 
> Table A.2 < 
 
Country sample 
The regression results are based on bilateral trade flows between the following 31 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0
0.5
1
Sizej
GLI of i and j
Sizei
 
Figure 1 – Relative country size as a determinant of CGLI
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Figure 2 – Relative factor endowments, trade costs, and investment costs as determinants of CGLI 
Table 1 - The Determinants of Intra-Industry Trade Shares (Between Regression Results; 1990-2000 Data)
LGLI LCGLIa LCGLIb
Maximum GDP: max{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ1 0.066 * 0.035 -0.181 ***
1.89 1.00 2.78
Minimum GDP: min{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ2 0.498 *** 0.470 *** 0.483 ***
13.18 12.35 6.74
Maximum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ3 0.255 *** 0.304 *** 0.898 ***
2.64 3.12 4.89
Minimum Capital--to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ4 0.283 *** 0.346 *** 0.199
4.35 5.23 1.60
Maximum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ5 -1.047 * -2.070 *** -3.918 ***
1.72 3.34 3.43
Minimum Skilled-to-Unksilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ6 0.112 -0.278 0.428
0.24 0.59 0.48
Maximum Investment Costs: max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ7 -1.039 *** -0.878 *** -1.155 ***
5.74 4.79 3.36
Minimum Investment Costs: min{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ8 0.043 0.166 0.474
0.24 0.90 1.38
Maximum Trade Costs: max{ln(tij),ln(tji)} δ9 -0.735 *** -0.544 *** -0.654 ***
11.11 8.15 5.46
Minimum Trade Costs: min{ln(tij),ln(tji)} δ10 0.187 ** 0.142 * 0.246 *
2.47 1.87 1.82
Constant δ0 -20.650 *** -17.838 *** -14.549 ***
10.64 9.10 3.94
Observations 866 866 422
R2 0.52 0.43 0.35
Share of R2, accounted for by variables 5-10 in % 48.96 41.39 47.88
F-tests (p-values):
     δ1=-δ2 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
     δ3=-δ4 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
     δ5=-δ6 0.153 0.000 *** 0.006 ***
     δ7=-δ8 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.036 **
     δ9=-δ10 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
The left-hand-side variables are logistically transformed and based on 5-digit SITC figures. Absolute t-statistics below coefficients.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 2 - Sensitivity Analysis of Trade-Imbalance Corrected Models
LCGLIa LCGLIb LCGLIa LCGLIb
Maximum GDP: max{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ1 0.064 *** -0.106 *** -0.254 * -2.181 ***
3.70 3.09 1.75 3.68
Minimum GDP: min{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ2 0.441 *** 0.503 *** -0.204 * -2.265 ***
23.91 14.01 1.81 3.85
Maximum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ3 0.218 *** 0.760 *** 1.786 *** 3.386 ***
4.57 8.08 2.81 3.08
Minimum Capital-to-Unksilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ4 0.357 *** 0.231 *** 1.796 *** 2.698 **
11.48 3.84 2.83 2.47
Maximum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ5 -1.337 *** -2.968 *** -0.559 -0.996
4.38 4.85 1.00 0.93
Minimum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ6 -0.274 0.104 0.636 3.759 ***
1.20 0.24 1.03 3.29
Maximum Investment Costs: max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ7 -0.809 *** -0.951 *** -0.482 *** -1.080 ***
9.22 5.62 4.13 4.78
Minimum Investment Costs: min{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ8 0.152 * 0.465 *** 0.585 *** 0.906 ***
1.69 2.78 4.71 3.94
Maximum Trade Costs: max{ln(tij),ln(tji)} δ9 -0.479 *** -0.603 *** -0.219 *** -0.147 ***
15.23 10.16 7.37 2.64
Minimum Trade Costs: min{ln(tij),ln(tji)} δ10 0.116 *** 0.266 *** 0.036 -0.073
3.22 4.03 1.16 1.32
Constant δ0 -20.102 *** -15.706 *** -32.393 ** 55.571 **
22.91 9.29 2.09 2.02
Observations 859 413 857 413
R2 0.82 0.74 0.90 0.89
Share of R2, accounted for by variables 5-10 in % 46.10 51.45 51.02 51.45
F-tests (p-values):
     δ1=-δ2 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.496 0.000 ***
     δ3=-δ4 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 ***
     δ5=-δ6 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.943 0.174
     δ7=-δ8 0.000 *** 0.003 *** 0.556 0.601
     δ9=-δ10 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
     Fixed exporter effects 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
     Fixed importer effects 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
No
No
Between Models Fixed Exporter and Importer Effects Models
No
No
The left-hand-side variables are logistically transformed and based on 5-digit SITC figures. All estimated models exclude extreme outliers. Absolute t-statistics below coefficients. *** significant at
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 3 - The Role of Labour for the Impact of Investment Costs 
LCGLIa LCGLIb
Maximum GDP: max{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ1 -0.249 *** -2.042 ***
10.76 3.43
Minimum GDP: min{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} δ2 -0.185 *** -2.125 ***
10.57 3.59
Maximum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ3 2.024 *** 3.185 ***
3.27 2.89
Minimum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} δ4 2.047 *** 2.540 **
3.31 2.31
Maximum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ5 -0.575 -1.281
1.04 1.18
Minimum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour: min{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} δ6 0.556 3.213 ***
0.91 2.79
Maximum Investment Costs: max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ7 -0.682 *** -1.401 ***
4.80 4.52
Minimum Investment Costs: min{ln(gi),ln(gj)} δ8 0.930 *** 1.292 ***
6.11 4.36
Maximum Trade Costs: max{ln(tij),ln(tji)} δ9 -0.22 *** -0.17 ***
7.36 3.07
Minimum Trade Costs: min{ln(t ij),ln(tji)} δ10 0.025 -0.038
0.83 0.68
Interaction: ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Li) if gi>gj, else ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Lj) δ11 0.033 *** 0.037 *
3.24 1.78
Interaction: ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Ki) if gi>gj, else ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Kj) δ12 - -
- -
Constant δ0 -38.86 ** 52.93 *
2.55 1.90
Observations 857 413
R2 0.90 0.89
The Role of Labor Endowments
The left-hand-side variables are logistically transformed and based on 5-digit SITC figures.The estimated 
models exclude extreme outliers and include country effects. ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)} is defined as max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} - 
min{ln(gi),ln(gj)}.
Absolute t-statistics below coefficients. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table 4 - Explaining the Trade-Imbalance in Relative Terms (SHI)
SHIa SHIb
∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)} -2.191 -89.663 **
1.52 2.12
Interaction: ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Li) if gi>gj, else ∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)}·ln(Lj) 1.551 * 7.719 **
1.80 2.06
Constant -2.452 -9.184
0.20 0.18
Observations 857 413
R2 0.11 0.03
F-tests (p-values):
     Joint significance of all other explanatory variables (see Footnote) 0.199 0.433
     Fixed exporter effects 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
    Fixed importer effects 0.011 ** 0.000 ***
∆{ln(gi),ln(gj)} is defined as max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} - min{ln(gi),ln(gj)}. Coefficients of max{ln(GDPi), ln(GDPj)}, min{ln(GDPi ),
ln(GDPj)}, max{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)}, min{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)}, max{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)}, min{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)}, max{ln(tij), ln(tji )}
min{ln(tij),ln(tji)} not reported due to their insignificance (see the F-statistics).
Absolute t-statistics below coefficients. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Table A.1 - Summary Statistics for Different Concepts of the Grubel-Lloyd Index
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Time Invar.a)
5-digit SITC data
GLI (usual definition) 8429 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.64 0.92
CGLIa (GLI balance-adjusted) 8429 0.23 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.91
CGLIb (GLI export-based, balance adjusted) 7259 0.24 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.94
4-digit SITC data
GLI (usual definition) 8495 0.17 0.15 0.00 0.71 0.91
CGLIa (GLI balance-adjusted) 8495 0.27 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.90
CGLIb (GLI export-based, balance adjusted) 6878 0.13 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.92
3-digit SITC data
GLI (usual definition) 8491 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.78 0.91
CGLIa (GLI balance-adjusted) 8491 0.33 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.88
CGLIb (GLI export-based, balance adjusted) 7472 0.21 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.89
a) This is the share of time-invariant information in the data.
Table A.2 - Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables (Variables in Logs)
Max GDP Min GDP Max K/L Min K/L Max S/L Min S/L Max INVC Min INVC Max TC Min TC
Maximum GDP: max{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} 1.00
Minimum GDP: min{ln(GDPi),ln(GDPj)} 0.45 1.00
Maximum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} 0.28 0.16 1.00
Minimum Capital-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Ki/Li),ln(Kj/Lj)} 0.13 0.11 0.45 1.00
Maximum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: max{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.36 1.00
Minimum Skilled-to-Unskilled Labour Ratio: min{ln(Si/Li),ln(Sj/Lj)} 0.17 -0.05 0.37 0.70 0.50 1.00
Maximum Investment Costs: max{ln(gi),ln(gj)} 0.05 0.20 -0.23 -0.02 -0.26 -0.20 1.00
Minimum Investment Costs: min{ln(gi),ln(gj)} -0.02 -0.06 -0.39 -0.29 -0.37 -0.23 0.56 1.00
Maximum Trade Costs: max{ln(tij),ln(tji)} -0.09 -0.15 -0.12 -0.24 -0.15 -0.26 -0.12 -0.01 1.00
Minimum Trade Costs: min{ln(tij),ln(tji)} -0.14 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 -0.07 -0.01 0.71 1.00
Mean 27.04 25.46 11.13 10.23 1.90 1.77 3.58 3.34 -1.46 -2.09
Standard Deviation 1.28 1.21 0.57 1.04 0.08 0.14 0.29 0.30 1.21 1.29
Descriptive Statistics
